Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000500140082-2

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23 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Science and Technology)

SUBJECT

: Reflections on DD/S&T Security Philosophies

- 1. At last week's DD/S&T Staff Meeting, I took particular note of your statement to the general effect that you favor "the fusion of DD/S&T assets" in attacking various scientific problems within your purview. My mind related this to a concern over security compartmentation which historically has characterized the efforts of OSA and its predecessor organizations.
- 2. I realize that you may have been speaking in essentially an organizational sense wherein you were advocating a corporate esprit de corps, but I have noticed parenthetically that since the establishment of DD/S&T, there have been a good many requests for critical OSA clearances where it was anything but clear to us that the "need-to-know" of the individual from another component of DD/S&T was. I have assumed in some instances that these clearance requests were in anticipation of some development, involving say OXCART or one of the other programs, about which we knew little at the time; yet I have not been able to find the string leading to the eventual goal, and since the number of these clearance requests is something of a constant, I decided to come out at least preliminarily for fission rather than fusion.
- 3. I should qualify my remarks by saying that I am not opposed in principle to seeing us accept and even seek the best talent and counsel available within DD/S&T and the Agency in meeting our many significant responsibilities. I am also aware that our end products in either photography or electronics are often subject to necessary analysis and evaluation, which require sensitive clearances which we control. Perhaps then I am simply arguing for the establishment of a definite need to participate prior to the granting of such clearances in order to hold down essential information about our programs which I am afraid are becoming household words not only with DD/S&T, but at an alarming rate throughout the Agency. The Director himself is charged with

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holding down to a minimum the number of people witting of these programs under our immediate purview, and in the case of the IDEALIST Program, for example. President Eisenhower on more than one occasion requested and obtained an itemized breakdown of all clearances within Government and industry, after which he admonished Mr. Dulles about keeping the list of knowledgeables to a minimum. In the case of the OXCART Program, the SST program has boiled to the top as a reason for clearing and briefing many people outside the Agency but somewhere in Government and industry. If not carefully checked, this could be a political bombshell under certain circumstances. The AR investigations have also resulted in many clearances we did not anticipate originally. The essentially political aspects of the R-12 procurement are daily pyramiding clearance upon clearance within the Pentagon and outside it. If there is to be any investigation regarding the proliferation of sensitive clearances, I hold to the hope that DD/S&T could lead the way in showing the smallest percentage of knowledgeables in terms of the job at hand. Finally, therefore, I would urge that all of us carefully examine the many requests within OSA before granting them simply on the grounds of position, anticipated possible need, or any other ancillary reason.

JAMES A. CUNNINGHAM, JR.
Acting Assistant Director
(Special Activities)

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